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SUMMARY
The purpose of the study is to determine the scope of application of the construction of abuse 
of subjective rights in cases involving the establishment of a regime of separate property by the 
court and the determination of unequal shares in the common property. The prerequisite for both 
the establishment of the regime of separate property and the determination of unequal shares in the 
common property are “important reasons”. In order to determine the admissibility of the application 
of Article 5 of the Polish Civil Code it is therefore necessary to define the meaning of the terms “im-
portant reasons” and “rules of social coexistence”. It is assumed herein that general clauses are a kind 
of reference, in terms of the interpretation of provisions to generically defined norms and non-legal 
assessments, which have, in principle, an axiological moral justification and, consequently, that only 
evaluative phrases, as “rules of social coexistence” can be referred to using this term. “Important 
reasons”, on the other hand, are not an evaluative phrase but an estimative phrase and therefore not 
a general clause. It was also considered that it could not be ruled the assessment, under Article 5 of 
the Polish Civil Code, of the request for the regime of separate property to be established by the court 
or the request for the establishment of unequal shares in the common property, taking into account 
the extent to which each of the spouses contributed to its creation.
Keywords: separate property; unequal shares in the common property; abuse of subjective right; 
rules of social coexistence; important reasons






The rights arising from existing relations between spouses are of a personal 
nature: property or non-property civil-law rights1. Matrimonial property rights, 
despite having a legal nature similar to property rights from civil-law relationships, 
are nevertheless characterized by a peculiar nature. The literature points out that 
the peculiarity of matrimonial property rights lies in the fact that they are rights 
closely linked to personal relations between spouses and are therefore effective 
only between them and are of a relative right nature. These rights are often shaped 
ad usum familiae, so their existence and content depend on the needs of the family, 
which distinguishes them from other property rights but at the same time make them 
more difficult to characterize2. Moreover, these rights appear to be much more sub-
ject to the operation of general clauses, in particular the rule of social coexistence, 
since they are created taking into account moral assumptions to a greater extent 
than other rights. That characteristic arises from the above-mentioned close link 
between matrimonial property relations and non-property relations3.
Matrimonial property rights include, in particular, rights arising from the rela-
tionship matrimonial property community (whether statutory or contractual). Such 
a subjective right is the possibility for each spouse to demand the separate property 
regime to be established by the court (Article 52 § 1 of the Family and Guardianship 
Code4) and the possibility for each spouse to demand the determination of shares 
in the common property taking into account the extent to which each of them con-
tributed to the creation of that property (Article 43 § 2 FGC)5. The prerequisite for 
both the establishment of the regime of separate property and the determination 
of unequal shares in the common property are important reasons. The use of the 
phrase “important reasons” by the legislature is intended to leave a certain degree 
of assessment discretion to the law-applying body. However, this phrase causes 
difficulties in interpretation6. In particular, this concerns the possibility of invok-
1 Zob. M. Pyziak-Szafnicka, [in:] System Prawa Prywatnego, vol. 1: Prawo cywilne – część 
ogólna, ed. M. Safjan, Warszawa 2012, p. 825 ff.
2 See, e.g., ibidem, p. 825, 835; J. Ignatowicz, M. Nazar, Prawo rodzinne, Warszawa 2016, p. 85; 
J. Winiarz, [in:] Kodeks rodzinny i opiekuńczy z komentarzem, ed. J. Pietrzykowski, Warszawa 1990, 
p. 14; idem, [in:] System prawa rodzinnego i opiekuńczego, ed. J.S. Piątowski, Wrocław 1985, p. 63.
3 Cf. J. Ignatowicz, M. Nazar, op. cit., p. 220.
4 Act of 25 February 1964 – Family and Guardianship Code (consolidated text 2019, item 2089), 
hereinafter: FGC.
5 Zob. M. Pyziak-Szafnicka, [in:] System Prawa Prywatnego, vol. 1, p. 835; J. Ignatowicz, 
M. Nazar, op. cit., p. 85.
6 See, e.g., Z. Radwański, A. Olejniczak, Prawo cywilne – część ogólna, Warszawa 2013, p. 44; 
A. Doliwa, Prawo cywilne – część ogólna, Warszawa 2004, p. 27; S. Grzybowski, [in:] System Prawa 
Cywilnego. Część ogólna, ed. S. Grzybowski, vol. 1, Wrocław 1985, p. 116 ff.
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ing the social coexistence rules clause in cases where the provisions setting out 
important reasons as a positive condition for a decision apply.
Both the questions of the understanding of the concept of important reasons and 
the application of Article 5 of the Civil Code7 in the event the court is requested 
for the establishment of the separate property regime and for the establishment of 
unequal shares in the common property were and are addressed in both literature 
and judicature. However, the views presented are not uniform.
RESEARCH
Before considering the applicability of Article 5 CC to the exercise of the 
above-mentioned rights, it should be noted that the application of Article 5 CC, both 
in literature and in case law, is subject to the fulfilment of three essential conditions: 
the existence of a subjective right, the exercise of that right and the contradiction 
between its use and the rules of social coexistence or the socio-economic purpose 
of the right. It must be assumed, however, that the rightholder, in exercising his/
her personal law, uses it consistent with the principles of social coexistence and 
with the socio-economic purpose of the right. It is only by establishing the specific 
circumstances of the case that it is possible to classify the enforcement and protec-
tion of the right as an abuse which does not merit protection8. Excessively liberal 
application of the construct of abuse of subjective law may lead to a challenge the 
certainty of legal transactions and a breach of the rule of law9.
7 Act of 23 April 1964 – Civil Code (consolidated text Journal of Laws 2020, item 1740 as 
amended), hereinafter: CC.
8 See judgement of the Supreme Court of 26 November 2004, I CK 279/04, LEX no. 277859. 
Cf., e.g., M. Pyziak-Szafnicka, [in:] System Prawa Prywatnego, vol. 1, p. 898 ff.; eadem, [in:] 
Kodeks cywilny. Część ogólna, ed. M. Pyziak-Szafnicka, Warszawa 2009, p. 99 ff.; S. Dmowski, 
R. Trzaskowski, [in:] Kodeks cywilny. Komentarz. Część ogólna, ed. J. Gudowski, Warszawa 2014, 
p. 52 ff.; A. Zbiegień-Turzańska, [in:] Kodeks cywilny. Komentarz, ed. K. Osajda, vol. 1, Warszawa 
2013, p. 325 ff.; T. Sokołowski, [in:] Kodeks cywilny. Komentarz, vol. 1: Część ogólna, ed. A. Ki-
dyba, Warszawa 2013, p. 41; T. Justyński, Nadużycie prawa w polskim prawie cywilnym, Kraków 
2000, p. 66 ff.
9 See, e.g., M. Pyziak-Szafnicka, [in:] System Prawa Prywatnego, vol. 1, p. 924 ff.; eadem, [in:] 
Kodeks cywilny…, p. 102 ff.; K. Pietrzykowski, [in:] Kodeks rodzinny i opiekuńczy. Komentarz, ed. 
K. Pietrzykowski, Warszawa 2015, p. 54 ff.; idem, Nadużycie prawa podmiotowego w prawie cywil-
nym, [in:] Nadużycie prawa, eds. H. Izdebski, A. Stępowski, Warszawa 2003, p. 126; Z. Radwański, 
A. Olejniczak, op. cit., p. 108; A. Wolter, J. Ignatowicz, K. Stefaniuk, Prawo cywilne. Zarys wykładu, 
Warszawa 2001, p. 152; resolution of the Supreme Court of 17 January 1974, III PZP 34/73, OSNCP 
1975, no. 1, item 4; judgement of the Supreme Court of 28 November 1967, I PR 415/67, OSP 1968, 
no. 10, item 210; judgement of the Supreme Court of 11 September 1961, I CR 963/61, OSNCP 1963, 
no. 2, item 31.





The construct of abuse of subjective rights regulated in Article 5 CC covers 
all normative forms of subjective rights: direct rights, claims and unilateral mod-
ification rights. The scope of Article 5 CC is very broad and covers all categories 
of civil-law relationships from all branches of civil law, in particular family law10. 
Such view is also expressed in the case law. The Supreme Court, in its judgement 
of 3 October 200011, stated that the content of Article 5 CC gives a possibility to 
assess compliance of the exercise of any subjective right with the rules of social 
coexistence, and in its judgement of 6 January 200512, the Supreme Court concluded 
that it was not apparent from the provision of Article 5 CC that its application was 
excluded in certain types of civil-law cases.
It seems, however, that matrimonial property rights, such as the right to demand 
the establishment of the separate property regime and to demand the establishment 
of unequal shares in common property, cannot be classified as one of the three 
typical forms of subjective rights (direct rights, claims, unilateral modification 
rights). However, they can be considered to be subjective rights which can be 
exercised through procedural steps, i.e. an action for the formation of a legal re-
lationship. In such cases, the situation of the rightholder is similar to the situation 
of the holder of a unilateral modification right. This is so because the legislature 
grants the rightholder the possibility to form the legal relationship, but does not 
provide him/her with a possibility to independently and directly achieve such legal 
effect. However, it grants a substantive-law legitimacy to demand that the court 
rule on the matter13. Therefore, the rightholder has the possibility to shape the 
existing legal relationship, but it cannot be considered that in this case he/she has 
the unilateral-modification right in the commonly accepted sense14. Ultimately, it 
is the court, and not the rightholder, that decides on the content or existence of the 
10 More in, e.g., S. Grzybowski, [in:] System Prawa Cywilnego…, p. 268 ff.; M. Pyziak-Szaf-
nicka, [in:] System Prawa Prywatnego, vol. 1, p. 886; eadem, [in:] Kodeks cywilny…, p. 70; K. Pie-
trzykowski, [in:] Kodeks cywilny, vol. 1: Komentarz. Art. 1–44910, ed. K. Pietrzykowski, Warszawa 
2015, p. 53 ff.; P. Machnikowski, [in:] Kodeks cywilny. Komentarz, eds. E. Gniewek, P. Machnikowski, 
Warszawa 2014, p. 19 ff.; S. Dmowski, R. Trzaskowski, op. cit., p. 52 ff.; A. Zbiegień-Turzańska, [in:] 
Kodeks cywilny…, p. 318; Z. Radwański, A. Olejniczak, op. cit., p. 107 ff.; T. Justyński, Nadużycie 
prawa w polskim prawie…, p. 63 ff.; idem, Konstrukcja nadużycia prawa jako instrument zapew-
nienia słuszności w związku ze sprawami małżeńskimi, [in:] Nam hoc natura aequum est… Księga 
Jubileuszowa ku czci Profesora Janusza Justyńskiego w siedemdziesięciolecie urodzin, ed. A. Madej, 
Toruń 2012, p. 518 ff.; A. Zbiegień-Turzańska, Zasady stosowania art. 5 Kodeksu cywilnego, „Monitor 
Prawniczy” 2013, no. 21, p. 1130.
11 I CKN 287/00, OSN 2001, no. 3, item 43.
12 III CK 129/04, Legalis no. 76870.
13 Cf. M. Pyziak-Szafnicka, [in:] System Prawa Prywatnego, vol. 1, p. 916 ff.; eadem, [in:] 
Kodeks cywilny…,, p. 75 ff.
14 As regards unilateral-modification rights, see, e.g., eadem, [in:] System Prawa Prywatnego, 
vol. 1, p. 812 ff.; Z. Radwański, A. Olejniczak, op. cit., p. 89 ff.; A. Wolter, J. Ignatowicz, K. Ste-
faniuk, Prawo cywilne. Zarys wykładu, Warszawa 2001, p. 159 ff.; M. Machnikowski, [in:] Zarys 
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legal relationship. However, adopting the classic approach to normative forms of 
subjective rights (direct subjective rights, claims and unilateral-modification rights, 
the particular form of which are pleas)15 one may agree with the view expressed in 
the scholarly opinion that unilateral-modification right in the strict sense and in the 
broad sense should be distinguished, and in cases where the law grants the entity 
a legitimacy to bring an action for modification of a legal relationship, such rights 
should be classified as unilateral-modification right in the broad sense16.
It is also pointed out in the literature, as a normative form of subjective law, 
the right resulting from substantive law to demand the legal relationship to be 
shaped by the court17. It is stressed that these rights cannot be considered either 
as claims or unilateral-modification rights. In such cases, a specific change in the 
legal relationship occurs only as a result of the court ruling. Prior to the issuance 
of a judgement, the rights and obligations of the parties have the content that was 
given to them by a legal act or by statutory provisions. Until a court decision is 
made, there can be no new or changed claim. Neither does the very declaration 
of will of a party change the content of the legal relationship as it happens in the 
case of unilateral-modification right. A demand to issue a ruling to shape the legal 
relationship is therefore considered to be a separate right, as it does not correspond 
in its construction to any normative form of subjective law in the classic sense. It 
is assumed that this is a different type of right: a procedural-law power, consisting 
in the possibility of bringing an action. It is also proposed to define this right as 
the right to request the shaping of a legal relationship by the court or as the right 
to bring an action for such shaping18.
Nevertheless, apart from the proposed terminology and classification of the 
normative forms of subjective rights, it should be assumed that the demand to 
establish the separate property regime and the demand to establish unequal shares 
in the common property are subjective rights, and the rightholder makes use of 
his/her rights when bringing an action. As a consequence, the behaviour of the 
rightholder exercising his/her right in these situations may be subject to assessment 
under Article 5 CC, but provided that the content of Article 52 § 1 and Article 43 
prawa cywilnego, eds. E. Gniewek, P. Machnikowski, Warszawa 2014, p. 32 ff.; A. Berć, Zarys prawa 
prywatnego. Część ogólna, Warszawa 2012, p. 102 ff.
15 See A. Wolter, J. Ignatowicz, K. Stefaniuk, Prawo cywilne. Zarys części…, p. 156 ff. A different 
view in, e.g., S. Grzybowski, Prawo cywilne. Zarys części ogólnej, Warszawa 1985, p. 113 ff.; idem, 
[in:] System Prawa Cywilnego…, p. 216 ff.; Z. Radwański, A. Olejniczak, op. cit., p. 84 ff.
16 For more detail, see M. Pyziak-Szafnicka, [in:] System Prawa Prywatnego, vol. 1, p. 815 ff.
17 See P. Machnikowski, [in:] System Prawa Prywatnego, vol. 5: Prawo zobowiązań – część 
ogólna, ed. E. Łętowska, Warszawa 2013, p. 165 ff.; idem, Swoboda umów według art. 3531 KC. 
Konstrukcja prawna, Warszawa 2005, p. 96 ff.; idem, [in:] Zarys prawa…, p. 33.
18 See P. idem, [in:] System Prawa Prywatnego, vol. 5, p. 165 ff.; idem, Swoboda umów…, p. 96 ff.; 
idem, [in:] Zarys prawa…, p. 33.





§ 2 FGC does not take into account the assessment from the point of view of the 
rules of social coexistence. Otherwise, the recourse to the construct of an abuse 
of a subjective right would be not necessary19. The application of the provision 
of Article 5 CC is excluded due to e.g. the content of the provisions governing 
a given legal institution, against which an abuse of the subjective right could be 
found20. Therefore, it is not possible to apply Article 5 CC when the actual state 
of affairs and its legal assessment are fully regulated by the provisions of law that 
fully protect the shares of specific entities21. It is noted that
[…] the abuse of law may not be invoked when a given factual state is fully regulated in a specific 
legal provision, in particular in a provision in which we can notice a prior assessment of conduct 
and determination of the consequences thereof, taking into account the criteria contained in Article 5 
CC or similar22. 
The Supreme Court, e.g. in the judgement of 4 October 196723, also indicated 
that the provision of Article 5 CC may not apply in a situation where the legis-
lature itself determines, as to certain factual states, when the use of a subjective 
right should be deprived of legal protection due to the rules of social coexistence.
However, the content of the provisions of Article 52 § 1 and Article 43 § 2 FGC 
does not allow us, on the basis of general rules of application of Article 5 CC, to 
clearly recognize the admissibility of applying the construct of abuse of a subjective 
right to assess the demand to establish the separate property regime by the court 
and the demand to establish unequal shares in the common property.
Both in the literature and in the judicature, the views on the admissibility of the 
application of Article 5 CC in cases of the establishment of the separate property 
regime (formerly – cases of the abolition of matrimonial property community) 
under the provision of Article 52 § 1 FGC are divided. The advocates of one of 
19 Cf. M. Pyziak-Szafnicka, [in:] System Prawa Prywatnego, vol. 1, p. 917; eadem, [in:] Kodeks 
cywilny…, p. 76.
20 See eadem, [in:] System Prawa Prywatnego, vol. 1, p. 917 ff.; eadem, [in:] Kodeks cywilny…, 
p. 107.
21 T. Justyński (Nadużycie prawa w polskim prawie…, p. 84) states that in such a case there is 
an exclusion of application of Article 5 CC due to lex specialis. However, a broader discussion of 
the issues related to the guideline lex specialis derogat legi generali goes beyond the scope of this 
article. See also, e.g., A. Szpunar, Uwagi o nadużyciu prawa podmiotowego, [in:] II Kongres No-
tariuszy RP, Poznań–Kluczbork 1999, p. 342; K. Pietrzykowski, [in:] Kodeks cywilny, vol. 1, p. 56; 
P. Machnikowski, [in:] Kodeks cywilny…, p. 21; A. Zbiegień-Turzańska, [in:] Kodeks cywilny…, 
p. 326; eadem, Zasady stosowania…, p. 1133.
22 A. Wolter, J. Ignatowicz, K. Stefaniuk, Prawo cywilne. Zarys części…, p. 180 and the case 
law referred to therein in footnote 99.
23 II PR 340/67, PiP 1968, no. 12, p. 1080. Cf. also, e.g., judgement of the Supreme Court 
of 17 May 2002, I CKN 827/00, OSP 2003, no. 12, item 157; judgement of the Supreme Court of 
29 November 2002, IV CKN 1549/00, Legalis no. 59158.
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these views point out that, in cases where a spouse strives, for important reasons, 
to establish the regime of separate property against his/her spouse by the court, 
Article 5 CC does not apply, since the assessment of such a demand from the point 
of view of the rules of social coexistence, in particular as regards the fault of the 
plaintiff and the protection of the family and the defendant spouse, must already 
be carried out as part of the determination of the important reasons justifying that 
demand24. Those authors, who exclude the application of Article 5 CC to the as-
sessment of the request for the establishment of the separate property regime by the 
spouse, state that the general clause of important reasons contained in Article 52 
§ 1 FGC allows for a full and proper assessment of the overall situation of the 
spouses, taking into account the specific circumstances25. According to a different 
interpretative conclusion, the request for the establishment of the separate property 
regime (formerly – the abolition of matrimonial property community) is subject 
to an assessment considering the clause of the rules of social coexistence, so the 
provision of Article 5 CC may form a basis for the dismissal of an action brought 
pursuant to Article 52 § 1 FGC26. The Supreme Court, in the grounds for its judge-
ment of 11 December 200827 stated that “the view expressed in the literature, which 
objects to the application of Article 5 CC to the request pursued under Article 52 
FGC, because the assessment of the request from the point of view of the rules of 
social coexistence must be carried out in the context of the determination of an 
important reason justifying that request, does not merit acceptance”. By contrast, in 
24 As viewed by, i.a., T. Justyński, Nadużycie prawa w związku z żądaniem zniesienia współ-
własności, „Przegląd Sądowy” 2003, no. 5, p. 50; T. Sokołowski, [in:] Kodeks rodzinny i opiekuń-
czy. Komentarz, eds. H. Dolecki, T. Sokołowski, Warszawa 2013, p. 365. Certain doubts regarding 
the application of Article 5 CC in the context of Article 52 § 1 FGC have also been presented by 
E. Skowrońska-Bocian referring the view of T. Sokołowski. See E. Skowrońska-Bocian, [in:] Kodeks 
rodzinny i opiekuńczy. Komentarz, ed. J. Wierciński, Warszawa 2014, p. 472; T. Smyczyński, Prawo 
rodzinne i opiekuńcze, Warszawa 2018, p. 147.
25 See T. Sokołowski, [in:] Kodeks rodzinny i opiekuńczy…, p. 365. Cf. T. Smyczyński, Prawo 
rodzinne…, p. 147.
26 As viewed by, i.a., J.S. Piątowski, [in:] System prawa…, p. 475 ff.; idem, Glosa do orzeczenia 
SN z dnia 25 marca 1958 r., 3 CR 45/58, „Państwo i Prawo” 1959, no. 1, p. 1077; L. Stecki, Ustanie 
ustawowej wspólności małżeńskiej majątkowej, Poznań 1986, p. 15 footnote 23; M. Wawiłowa, Glosa 
do wyroku SN z dnia 6 listopada 1972 r., III CRN 250/72, „Państwo i Prawo” 1974, no. 7, p. 169; B. Do-
brzański, Glosa do wyroku Sądu Najwyższego z dnia 6 listopada 1972 r., III CRN 250/72, „Orzecznictwo 
Sądów Polskich” 1973, no. 1, p. 349; M. Sychowicz, [in:] Kodeks rodzinny i opiekuńczy. Komentarz, 
ed. K. Piasecki, Warszawa 2009, p. 332; J. Ignaczewski, [in:] Małżeńskie prawo majątkowe. Komen-
tarz, ed. J. Ignaczewski, Warszawa 2014, p. 216 ff.; J. Pawliczak, [in:] Kodeks rodzinny i opiekuńczy. 
Komentarz, ed. K. Osajda, Warszawa 2017, p. 593; G. Jędrejek, [in:] Meritum. Prawo rodzinne, ed. 
G. Jędrejek, Warszawa 2017, p. 348. See also – despite some doubts – E. Skowrońska-Bocian, op. cit., 
p. 472. Cf. K. Pietrzykowski, [in:] Kodeks cywilny, vol. 1, p. 61 ff. This view is also pointed to by 
A. Dyoniak (Ustawowy ustrój majątkowy małżeński, Wrocław 1985, p. 116 ff.).
27 II CSK 371/08, OSNC 2009, no. 12, item 171,





its judgement of 17 September 199928, the Supreme Court stated that “the fault of 
the spouse requesting the matrimonial property community to be abolished [now – 
the establishment of the regime of separate property] and the considerations of the 
good of the family or the defendant spouse must be taken into account only when 
assessing the request for the abolition of community [now – the establishment of the 
separate property regime] from the point of view of the rules of social coexistence 
(Article 5 CC). The dismissal of an action on the grounds of those circumstances 
can therefore only take place exceptionally where the request for the abolition of 
the matrimonial property community [now – the establishment of the separate 
property regime] has, in the specific circumstances, a nature of abuse of right”.
If the application of Article 5 CC is admissible for the assessment of the request 
to determine shares in the common property, taking into account the degree of the 
spouses’ contribution to the creation of this property (Article 43 § 2 FGC) it may be 
assumed that the same position is presented both in the case law and in the scholarly 
opinion. This is so because it is usually pointed out that important reasons within 
the meaning of this provision are moral considerations, which make the acceptance 
of equal shares of the spouses in the common property would contradict, in the 
situation under assessment, the rules of social coexistence29. The Supreme Court, in 
its decision of 21 November 200230, stated that important reasons are circumstances 
which, assessed from the point of view of the rules of social coexistence, preclude 
28 I CKN 129/99, Legalis no. 45959. Cf. judgement of the Supreme Court of 4 April 2014, II CSK 
387/13, OSNC 2015, no. 4, item 46; judgement of the Supreme Court of 11 December 2008, II CSK 
371/08, OSNC 2009, no. 12, item 171; judgement of the Supreme Court of 8 May 2003, II CKN 78/01, 
LEX no. 80245; judgement of the Supreme Court of 12 September 2000, III CKN 373/99, Legalis 
no. 56332; judgement of the Supreme Court of 27 January 2000, III CKN 426/98, Legalis no. 56331; 
judgement of the Supreme Court of 13 May 1997, III CKN 51/97, OSNC 1997, no. 12, item 194.
29 See, e.g., J.S. Piątowski, [in:] System prawa rodzinnego…, p. 490 ff.; idem, Udziały małżonków 
w majątku wspólnym, [in:] Studia z prawa cywilnego. Księga pamiątkowa dla uczczenia 50-lecia 
pracy naukowej Prof. dr. hab. Adama Szpunara, ed. A. Rembieliński, Warszawa–Łódź 1983, p. 292 ff.; 
J. Pietrzykowski, [in:] Kodeks rodzinny i opiekuńczy z komentarzem…, p. 235; M. Sychowicz, op. cit., 
p. 261; J. Ignaczewski, op. cit., p. 142; K. Skiepko, [in:] Komentarz do spraw o podział majątku 
wspólnego małżonków, ed. J. Ignaczewski, Warszawa 2017, p. 293; J. Słyk, [in:] Kodeks rodzinny 
i opiekuńczy. Komentarz, ed. K. Osajda, p. 478; G. Jędrejek, op. cit., p. 334; T. Sokołowski, [in:] 
Kodeks rodzinny i opiekuńczy…, p. 273; E. Skowrońska-Bocian, op. cit., p. 401 ff.; K. Pietrzykow-
ski, [in:] Kodeks rodzinny i opiekuńczy. Komentarz…, p. 328 ff. As T. Justyński writes (Nadużycie 
prawa w związku z żądaniem…, p. 50 ff.),  “the issue of admissibility of application of Article 5 CC 
to ‘increase’ the proportions of shares of the co-owners has been definitely negatively resolved. This 
conclusion in its entirety must concern also joint co-ownership. Also in this situation it would not be 
possible to use the construct of abuse of right to perform this kind of ‘operation’”.
30 III CKN 1018/00, Legalis no. 57304. Similarly, e.g., decision of the Supreme Court of 
22 September 1997, II CKN 306/97, Legalis no. 343297; decision of the Supreme Court of 28 April 
1972, III CRN 626/71, Legalis no. 16220. See also the grounds for the decision of the Supreme Court 
of 19 December 2012, II CSK 259/12, Legalis no. 550174 and the grounds for the decision of the 
Supreme Court of 24 April 2013, IV CSK 553/12, Legalis no. 741808.
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granting to one of the spouses benefits from this part of the common property to 
which this spouse did not contribute.
Therefore, in the event of a request for establishing the separate property regime 
and a request for establishing unequal shares in the common property, to deter-
mine the admissibility of applying Article 5 CC it is first necessary to establish the 
meaning of the concepts of “important reasons” and “rules of social coexistence”.
The legislature did not make the term of “important reasons” more specific. In 
the literature on family law, however, it is noted that this is an evaluative and am-
biguous concept, as it takes on different content depending on the statutory context 
in which it occurs, which undoubtedly contributes to divergent interpretations31. 
At the same time, it is pointed out that important reasons within the meaning of 
Article 52 § 1 FGC cannot be equated with important reasons within the meaning 
of Article 43 § 2 FGC32. It is emphasized that the much more serious effects of 
establishing unequal shares in common property support a more restrictive inter-
pretation of important reasons in the context of the regulation of Article 43 § 1 
FGC. This is so because in the event of property separation, both spouses retain 
equal rights to the common property, and in the event of unequal shares being es-
tablished, the rights of one of the spouses are permanently limited and may even 
be completely eliminated as a result of depriving this spouse of the entire share in 
the common property33.
Generally, it is noted that while important reasons under Article 52 § 1 FGC are 
of a property nature, in Article 43 § 2 FGC the circumstances of a property nature 
are included in the prerequisite of the unequal contribution to the creation of com-
mon property and important reasons are of an ethical nature34. In turn, the Supreme 
Court, in its substantiation for the decision of 24 April 201335 stated that the criterion 
of “important reasons” under Article 43 § 2 FGC has not only a property aspect, 
but also an ethical one. The Supreme Court also argued that: 1) depending on the 
circumstances of the case, ethical considerations may speak against establishing 
31 See J.S. Piątowski, [in:] System prawa rodzinnego…, p. 473.
32 See, e.g., ibidem, p. 490; idem, Udziały małżonków…, p. 292; J. Ignatowicz, M. Nazar, op. cit., 
p. 309; J. Ignaczewski, op. cit., p. 141; K. Skiepko, op. cit., p. 293; T. Sokołowski, [in:] Kodeks ro-
dzinny i opiekuńczy…, p. 274; E. Skowrońska-Bocian, op. cit., p. 401. Cf. decision of the Supreme 
Court of 27 June 2003, IV CKN 278/01, Legalis no. 61009.
33 See, e.g., J.S. Piątowski, [in:] System prawa rodzinnego…, p. 490; idem, Udziały małżonków…, 
p. 292; J. Ignatowicz, M. Nazar, op. cit., p. 309; J. Ignaczewski, op. cit., p. 141; K. Skiepko, op. cit., 
p. 293; T. Sokołowski, [in:] Kodeks rodzinny i opiekuńczy…, p. 274; E. Skowrońska-Bocian, op. cit., 
p. 401. Cf. decision of the Supreme Court of 27 June 2003, IV CKN 278/01, Legalis no. 61009.
34 See J.S. Piątowski, [in:] System prawa rodzinnego…, p. 490; J. Ignaczewski, op. cit., p. 142; 
K. Skiepko, op. cit., p. 293; T. Sokołowski, [in:] Kodeks rodzinny i opiekuńczy…, p. 274; M. Sycho-
wicz, op. cit., p. 261; E. Skowrońska-Bocian, op. cit., p. 401 ff. Cf. decision of the Supreme Court 
of 27 June 2003, IV CKN 278/01, Legalis no. 61009.
35 IV CSK 553/12, Legalis no. 741808.





unequal shares, but they may well prevent leaving equal shares; 2) the argument 
that “important reasons” should be understood as circumstances which, in the light 
of the rules of social co-existence, oppose granting one of the spouses the benefits 
from that part of the common property to which the spouse did not contribute; and 3) 
the assessment whether the conditions set out in Article 43 § 2 FGC are met cannot 
be schematic, but – taking into account the assumptions noted above – should be 
individualised and based on the analysis of specific circumstances of a given case.
Based on the views expressed in the literature and case law, it can be generally 
assumed that “important reasons” referred to in Article 52 § 1 FGC should be un-
derstood as circumstances causing that in a specific factual situation the existence 
of statutory matrimonial property community would lead to an infringement or 
serious threat to the property interest of the spouse applying for the establishment 
of property separation, as well as the economic foundation for the functioning of the 
family established by the spouses. Important reasons may be differences between 
spouses which make the administration of their common property impossible or 
very difficult36. Therefore, the catalogue of important reasons includes, inter alia, 
the misspending by one of the spouses as a result of mismanagement, alcoholism, 
gambling, avoidance of the duty to maintain and contribute to the common property, 
preventing the spouse from using the common property, actual separation of the 
spouses, which prevents them from cooperating in the management of the com-
mon property or independently assuming obligations that encumber the common 
property37. It should be stressed, however, that important reasons in the context of 
36 Cf., i.a., J.S. Piątowski, [in:] System prawa rodzinnego…, p. 474 ff.; J. Ignatowicz, M. Nazar, 
op. cit., p. 331; T. Smyczyński, Prawo rodzinne…, p. 142; M. Sychowicz, op. cit., p. 333; J. Ignaczew-
ski, op. cit., p. 218 ff.; J. Pawliczak, op. cit., p. 589 ff.; G. Jędrejek, op. cit., p. 394; T. Sokołowski, 
[in:] Kodeks rodzinny i opiekuńczy…, p. 365; E. Skowrońska-Bocian, op. cit., p. 473; K. Pietrzykow-
ski, [in:] Kodeks rodzinny i opiekuńczy. Komentarz…, p. 372; A. Dyoniak, Glosa do wyroku Sądu 
Najwyższego z dnia 24 maja 1994 r., I CRN 61/94, „Orzecznictwo Sądów Polskich” 1995, item 96; 
judgement of the Supreme Court of 31 January 2003, IV CKN 1710/00, Legalis no. 59149.
37 For more detail on important reasons under Article 52 § 1 FGC, see, i.a., J.S. Piątowski, [in:] 
System prawa rodzinnego…, p. 474 ff.; J. Pietrzykowski, [in:] Kodeks rodzinny i opiekuńczy z komenta-
rzem…, p. 272 ff.; J. Ignatowicz, M. Nazar, op. cit., p. 331; T. Smyczyński, Prawo rodzinne…, p. 142 ff.; 
M. Andrzejewski, Prawo rodzinne i opiekuńcze, Warszawa 2014, p. 88; M. Sychowicz, op. cit., 
p. 333 ff.; J. Ignaczewski, op. cit., p. 218 ff.; J. Pawliczak, op. cit., p. 588 ff.; G. Jędrejek, op. cit., 
p. 393 ff.; T. Sokołowski, [in:] Kodeks rodzinny i opiekuńczy…, p. 365 ff.; E. Skowrońska-Bocian, 
op. cit., p. 472 ff.; K. Pietrzykowski, [in:] Kodeks rodzinny i opiekuńczy. Komentarz…, p. 372 ff.; 
A. Lutkiewicz-Rucińska, Odpowiedzialność majątkiem wspólnym za zobowiązania cywilnoprawne 
współmałżonka, Bydgoszcz–Gdańsk 2003, p. 83 ff.; A. Oleszko, Ważne powody jako przesłanka znie-
sienia wspólności majątkowej w czasie trwania małżeństwa w świetle orzecznictwa Sądu Najwyższego 
i doktryny, „Palestra” 1978, no. 1, p. 6 ff. and the case law referred to therein.
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the provisions of Article 52 § 1 FGC should be of a property nature, although they 
may also result from personal discords between spouses38.
The interpretations of Article 43 § 2 FGC indicate that “important reasons” 
mean circumstances which, when assessed from the point of view of the rules of 
social coexistence, oppose the granting to one of the spouses of a benefit from the 
common property to the extent in which he/she did not contribute to its creation39. 
However, in assessing the existence of important reasons, account must be taken 
of the entire behaviour of the spouses during the period of the property communi-
ty as regards the performance of their obligations towards the family established 
through their relationship40. Examples of “important reasons” within the meaning 
of Article 43 § 2 FGC include: the gross and persistent failure to contribute to the 
common property according to their abilities and earning capacity; the gross and 
persistent violation of family obligations; prolonged actual separation of spouses, 
during which each spouse independently has built and disposed of the property; 
fault that may be attributed for the breakdown of their marriage41.
Some family law scholars, when writing about the notion of “important rea-
sons”, point only generally to the fact that this is a general clause42. Others argue 
that “important reasons” is a vague phrase, also characterized as a referring clause 
38 See, e.g., M. Sychowicz, op. cit., p. 334 ff.; J. Ignaczewski, op. cit., p. 220 ff.; J. Pawliczak, 
op. cit., p. 590; E. Skowrońska-Bocian, op. cit., p. 474; K. Pietrzykowski, [in:] Kodeks rodzinny 
i opiekuńczy. Komentarz…, p. 373; T. Smyczyński, Prawo rodzinne…, p. 143; B. Dobrzański, op. cit., 
p. 346 ff. and the case law referred to therein.
39 P. Szołdrowski notes that the term “important reasons” cannot be enclosed within the reference 
to the rules of social coexistence. The author emphasizes that if this was so, the legislature would 
refer in Article 43 § 2 FGC directly to the rules of social coexistence instead of using the clause of 
important reasons. See P. Szołdrowski, Żądanie ustalenia nierównych udziałów w majątku wspólnym 
w postępowaniu o podział majątku wspólnego, „Kwartalnik Prawa Prywatnego” 2019, no. 1, p. 165. 
Cf. T. Smyczyński, Glosa do postanowienia SN z dnia 6 stycznia 2000 r., I CKN 320/98, „Orzecz-
nictwo Sądów Polskich” 2001, no. 9, p. 468.
40 See, i.a., M. Sychowicz, op. cit., p. 261; J. Ignaczewski, op. cit., p. 142; J. Słyk, op. cit., p. 478; 
G. Jędrejek, op. cit., p. 334 ff.; T. Sokołowski, [in:] Kodeks rodzinny i opiekuńczy. Komentarz…, 
p. 273. See also, i.a., grounds for the decision of the Supreme Court of 19 December 2012, II CSK 
259/12, Legalis no. 550174; grounds for the decision of the Supreme Court of 21 November 2002, 
III CKN 1018/00, Legalis no. 57304; decision of the Supreme Court of 5 October 1974, III CRN 
190/74, Legalis no. 18318.
41 For more detail on important reasons under Article 43 § 2 FGC, see, i.a., J.S. Piątowski, [in:] 
System prawa rodzinnego…, p. 490 ff.; idem, Udziały małżonków…, p. 293 ff.; J. Pietrzykowski, [in:] 
Kodeks rodzinny i opiekuńczy z komentarzem…, p. 235 ff.; J. Ignatowicz, M. Nazar, op. cit., p. 309; 
M. Sychowicz, op. cit., p. 261 ff.; J. Ignaczewski, op. cit., p. 142 ff.; K. Skiepko, op. cit., p. 293 ff.; 
J. Słyk, op. cit., p. 478 ff.; G. Jędrejek, op. cit., p. 334 ff.; T. Sokołowski, [in:] Kodeks rodzinny 
i opiekuńczy. Komentarz…, p. 273; E. Skowrońska-Bocian, op. cit., p. 401 ff.; K. Pietrzykowski, [in:] 
Kodeks rodzinny i opiekuńczy. Komentarz…, p. 328 ff. and the case law referred to therein.
42 See, e.g., T. Sokołowski, [in:] Kodeks rodzinny i opiekuńczy. Komentarz…, p. 365; T. Smy-
czyński, Prawo rodzinne…, p. 147; A. Oleszko, op. cit., p. 15.





or a general clause in a functional sense, the purpose of which is to provide the 
court with the necessary flexibility in the classification of facts43.
It is usually noted that sometimes general clauses are equated with all vague 
phrases44. In the literature of civil law, general clause is defined as a vague phrase 
contained in a legal provision, denoting certain values or assessments functioning 
in a social group to which that provision refers by requiring them to be taken into 
account in finding the facts covered by a given norm. On the other hand, the as-
sessments referred to by the general clauses include moral assessments (e.g. rules 
of social coexistence) and economic-type measures (e.g. socio-economic purpose 
of law) and rational measures (e.g. reason)45.
Scholars in the field also emphasize that different meanings are attributed to the 
term “general clause”46. Law theorists, who point out that the literature distinguishes 
six approaches which in various ways relate to the scope of the concept of “general 
clause”. According to the broad approach, it is assumed that the general clause should 
determine any normative basis for the discretion margin in the process of applying 
the law (general clauses in functional terms). The narrower approach emphasizes the 
indeterminate character of meaning of the phrase containing the clause, whether it 
refers to facts, norms or assessments. Another approach limits the reference field and 
includes only those references that require non-legal assessments to be included in 
the clauses. The next approach, which is a significant narrowing of the previous one, 
considers these evaluative indeterminate phrases, which refer the decision-maker to 
assessments and norms in a way that is oriented by the name of the non-legal criterion. 
Another approach limits the previous one by associating the concept of general clause 
only with such a reference to the assessment system, which additionally expresses 
a sort of guiding principle. The last approach, on the other hand, attaches importance 
to the very place of the reference in a legislative act, because the general clause is 
a reference which is contained in the general part of the normative act and can be 
used when applying various rules or bodies governed by that act47.
Therefore, the understanding of the notion of general clause depends on which of 
the foregoing approaches we adopt, but in any case general clauses are vague phrases. 
However, there are two main groups among the vague phrases: estimative phrases 
and evaluative phrases. The estimative phrases express the criterion of assessing 
situations, the conduct of parties to legal relationships, the degree of severity of a phe-
43 See J. Pawliczak, op. cit., p. 588.
44 See Z. Radwański, M. Zieliński, [in:] System Prawa Prywatnego, vol. 1, p. 391. In the literature 
on the subject, reference clauses are often called simply indeterminate phrases, vague phrases, eva-
luative phrases, reference phrases or – most often – general clauses. See L. Leszczyński, Stosowanie 
generalnych klauzul odsyłających, Kraków 2001, p. 21 ff.
45 See Z. Radwański, A. Olejniczak, op. cit., p. 45; Z. Radwański, M. Zieliński, op. cit., p. 394.
46 A. Doliwa, op. cit., p. 27.
47 For more detail, see L. Leszczyński, op. cit., p. 28 ff. and the literature referred to therein.
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nomenon or state of affairs, covered the scope of application or regulation of a legal 
norm. They leave the law-applying body a necessary discretion margin in seeking 
the legal classification of a specific factual situation as set out in the legal norm. Such 
an estimative phrase is, for example, “important reasons”. Evaluative phrases, on the 
other hand, define, together with other phrases contained in the provision, the scope 
of application or regulation of a legal norm. They also leave the law-applying body 
a discretion margin, but first and foremost they delineate the content of a legal norm 
adequate to the specific facts, so they constitute a determinant of the legal content. An 
example of such evaluative phrase is, for example, the “rules of social coexistence”48.
Thus, assuming that general clauses are a kind of reference, in terms of the 
interpretation of provisions to generically defined norms and non-legal assessments, 
which have, in principle, an axiological moral justification, it should be stated that 
only evaluative phrases can be referred to with this term. On the other hand, “im-
portant reasons” are an estimative phrase and thus cannot be regarded as a general 
clause in the above sense49.
Estimative phrases contain two elements, i.e. a description of the facts that need 
to be found in the decision-making process as actually occurring (e.g. circumstances, 
causes) and an evaluation statement that leads to the expression of a specific prop-
erty (e.g. important, specific). The element of assessment indicates the need to 
estimate the degree of occurrence of a given condition (size, weight, intensity, etc.). 
This assessment is of an individual, situational nature. This situational character 
consists in that in a given situation it is necessary to determine the existence of not 
any reasons, but only important ones. The assessment does not refer directly to any 
normative system, although, as it is argued, certain norms, mainly moral ones, can 
be employed in estimating as an auxiliary measure. Nevertheless, it must be stated 
that estimative phrases are a category distinct from the category of references to 
the evaluation system50.
Therefore, in order for the court to establish the separate property regime (Arti-
cle 52 § 1 FGC) or to establish shares in common property taking into account the 
degree to which each of the spouses contributed to the creation of such property 
(Article 43 § 2 FGC), it must first find the existence of reasons behind the seeking 
of the decisions indicated and then estimate their importance. Determining the 
weight of the reasons indicated in the request for a decision is a prerequisite in 
both cases indicated.
48 See M. Nazar, [in:] T.A. Filipiak, J. Mojak, M. Nazar, E. Niezbecka, Zarys prawa cywilnego, 
Lublin 2010, p. 54. Cf. S. Grzybowski, [in:] System Prawa Cywilnego…, p. 118 ff.; Z. Radwański, 
A. Olejniczak, op. cit., p. 44 ff.; Z. Radwański, M. Zieliński, op. cit., p. 391 ff. For more detail, see 
L. Leszczyński, op. cit., p. 25 ff.
49 Cf. M. Nazar, op. cit., p. 54. More broadly L. Leszczyński, op. cit., p. 30 ff.
50 See L. Leszczyński, op. cit., p. 25 ff.






As a conclusion, it should be pointed out that both the right to demand the 
establishment of the separate property regime and the determination of unequal 
shares in the common property may be exercised if there are important reasons. 
“Important reasons” is an estimative phrase. As it seems, the importance of rea-
sons can be assessed from three points of reference: economic, praxeological and 
ethical51. Thus, important reasons regulated in Article 52 § 1 FGC can be assessed 
in an economic aspect (e.g. lack of cooperation in the creation of common proper-
ty), praxeological aspect (e.g. lack of cooperation in the management of common 
property) and probably also ethical one (e.g. reprehensibility of the spouse’s be-
haviour in the above-mentioned examples). In turn, in the provision of Article 43 
§ 2 FGC, the legislature formulated an additional prerequisite apart from important 
reasons, namely the degree of the spouses’ contribution to the creation of the com-
mon property. Of course, the general rule of correct interpretation is to assign the 
same meaning to the same terms (especially in the same statutory act). However, 
the indication of an additional separate economic criterion suggests that important 
reasons should be determined with the ethical aspect taken into account. Thus, 
both in the case of a request for the establishment of the separate property regime 
and the determination of unequal shares in common property, the ethical aspect of 
important reasons is to be taken into account. However, this cannot preclude the 
application of Article 5 CC in both cases. Of course, Article 5 CC shall not apply 
if separate regulations allow for proper resolution of the case. It seems, however, 
that Article 52 § 1 and Article 43 § 2 FGC with the phrase “important reasons” do 
not, by themselves, ensure proper resolution. Although the content of the rules of 
social coexistence and important reasons may overlap to some extent, Article 5 
CC has a much broader spectrum of content and reference to ethical assessments.
As a consequence, as it seems, it could not be ruled the assessment, under Arti-
cle 5 CC, of the request for the regime of separate property to be established by the 
court or the request for the establishment of shares in the common property, taking 
into account the extent to which each of the spouses contributed to its creation. 
The prerequisites for finding an abuse of a subjective right should be, first of all, 
improper and reprehensible behaviour of the spouse who requests the establishment 
of the separate property regime or establishment of unequal shares, not worthy of 
protection, as well as the shares of the defendant spouse and the good of the family 
established by the spouses.
51 Cf. ibidem, p. 26.
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STRESZCZENIE
Celem opracowania jest ustalenie zakresu stosowania konstrukcji nadużycia prawa podmiotowe-
go w sprawach o ustanowienie rozdzielności majątkowej przez sąd i ustalanie nierównych udziałów 
w majątku wspólnym. Przesłanką zarówno ustanowienia rozdzielności majątkowej, jak i ustalenia 
nierównych udziałów w majątku wspólnym są „ważne powody”. Do ustalenia dopuszczalności sto-
sowania art. 5 Kodeksu cywilnego konieczne jest ustalenie zakresów znaczeniowych pojęć „ważne 
powody” i „zasady współżycia społecznego”. W artykule przyjęto, że klauzule generalne to rodzaj 
odesłania w zakresie interpretacji przepisów do rodzajowo określonych norm i ocen pozaprawnych, 
mający co do zasady aksjologiczne uzasadnienie moralne, a co za tym idzie tylko zwroty wartościu-
jące, jak „zasady współżycia społecznego”, mogą być określane tym mianem. „Ważne powody” 
natomiast nie są zwrotem wartościującym, lecz zwrotem szacującym i tym samym nie są klauzulą 
generalną. Uznano również, że nie można wykluczyć oceny przez pryzmat przepisu art. 5 Kodeksu 
cywilnego żądania ustanowienia przez sąd rozdzielności majątkowej czy też żądania ustalenia nie-
równych udziałów w majątku wspólnym z uwzględnieniem stopnia, w którym każdy z małżonków 
przyczynił się do jego powstania.
Słowa kluczowe: rozdzielność majątkowa; nierówne udziały w majątku wspólnym; nadużycie 
prawa podmiotowego; zasady współżycia społecznego; ważne powody
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